For seven consecutive weeks, the Kremlin's carefully curated image of unwavering public support for President Vladimir Putin began to crack. According to data from the state-affiliated Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM), Putin's approval ratings steadily declined, reaching levels unseen since the early months of the war in Ukraine. Then, on April 24, the publication of these figures abruptly ceased. The move—widely interpreted as an attempt to hide the erosion of Putin's popularity—has sparked intense speculation among analysts and political observers about the stability of Russia's political system.

The Numbers the Kremlin Doesn't Want You to See

VTsIOM, which had been releasing weekly updates on Putin's approval ratings since the start of his presidency, suddenly stopped after the April 24 report. The last published figure showed Putin's approval rating at around 76%, a significant drop from the 80%+ numbers that had been typical since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. While 76% might still seem high by Western standards, the trend was unmistakable: a steady decline over two months, with no signs of bottoming out. For a leader whose entire political legitimacy rests on the perception of unwavering public support, even a gradual decline is alarming.

Other polls, including those conducted by the independent Levada Center, have shown even sharper falls. Levada's March 2025 survey placed Putin's approval rating at 74%, down from 82% in January. The gap between state and independent polls has widened, further undermining the credibility of official statistics. The Kremlin's decision to silence VTsIOM suggests that the real numbers are worse than those already published.

Why Is Putin's Popularity Sinking?

Several factors have converged to erode Putin's support base. The most immediate is the prolonged war in Ukraine, now in its fourth year. Casualties continue to mount—estimated at over 200,000 Russian soldiers killed or wounded—and the economic cost is immense. Western sanctions have crippled key sectors, leading to shortages, inflation, and a decline in living standards. Ordinary Russians are feeling the pinch: prices for basic goods have risen by 15–20% over the past year, while wages have stagnated.

In addition, the partial mobilization of September 2022 left a lasting scar. Many families lost husbands, sons, and brothers. Reports of poor equipment, inadequate training, and heavy losses have fueled resentment. The Kremlin's attempt to frame the war as a defensive necessity has worn thin, especially among residents of ethnic minority regions who bear a disproportionate burden of the fighting.

Domestic policy failures also play a role. Despite massive state spending, infrastructure is crumbling, healthcare is underfunded, and corruption remains rampant. The arrest of several high-ranking officials on bribery charges has done little to restore faith in the system. Meanwhile, the regime's increasingly repressive tactics—cracking down on dissent, independent media, and political opposition—have alienated even some of its traditional supporters, such as the educated urban middle class.

The End of the 'Putin Majority'?

For years, the Kremlin operated on the assumption that a solid core of voters—the so-called 'Putin majority'—would always back the president, no matter what. This group included older Russians nostalgic for Soviet stability, rural populations reliant on state pensions, and employees of state-owned enterprises. But recent polls suggest that even this bedrock is cracking. The share of Russians who 'fully trust' Putin fell from 45% in early 2024 to 34% in March 2025, according to the independent Public Opinion Foundation.

Younger Russians, in particular, are drifting away. Many have left the country since the war began—an estimated 500,000 to 1 million people—draining the nation of talent and tax revenue. Those who remain are increasingly skeptical of state propaganda. For them, the war is not a patriotic crusade but a senseless waste of resources that could have been used for education, housing, and healthcare.

What the Kremlin Fears: Power Struggle Over Succession

The decision to hide VTsIOM's data is not just about public perception—it is about internal power dynamics. As one Kremlin insider told the independent outlet Meduza, 'Putin's falling ratings could become the trigger for a fight within the power apparatus.' In a system built on personal loyalty, a weakened leader invites challenges from rival factions.

For years, Putin has balanced the competing interests of the siloviki (security and military officials), the technocrats, and the oligarchs. But as his authority wanes, these groups may begin maneuvering for position. The war in Ukraine has already elevated the security services—the FSB, the National Guard, and the military command—at the expense of the civilian bureaucracy. Figures like Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, despite his own reputational damage, or the head of the National Guard, Viktor Zolotov, could emerge as kingmakers—or pretenders to the throne.

Factional infighting is already visible. In early 2025, a series of corruption investigations targeted officials linked to the 'systemic liberals'—the wing of the elite that advocates for economic modernization and caution. These purges are widely seen as a signal that the siloviki are consolidating power. Yet even among the hardliners, there is no consensus on how to manage the war or the economy. Divisions over strategy—escalation versus negotiation, mobilization versus contract army—run deep.

Historical Precedents: The Fall of the Tsars and Soviet Leaders

Russia has a long history of leaders whose popularity collapsed before their authority crumbled. Tsar Nicholas II saw his approval plummet during World War I, leading to the February Revolution in 1917. Nikita Khrushchev was ousted in 1964 after the Cuban Missile Crisis and agricultural failures eroded his support. Mikhail Gorbachev's approval ratings fell as the Soviet economy deteriorated, culminating in the USSR's collapse.

Putin's situation differs in important ways: he has no formal mechanism for succession, and the security apparatus remains firmly loyal to him personally. But history suggests that when a Russian leader's popularity declines sharply and persistently, the system itself becomes unstable. The turn of the 20th century saw the Russian Empire unravel; the 1990s saw the Soviet Union dissolve. Putin's regime, with its heavy reliance on a single personality, is arguably more brittle than it appears.

Can Putin Reverse the Trend?

The Kremlin's immediate response has been a mixture of propaganda and repression. State television now avoids discussing approval ratings altogether, focusing instead on patriotic narratives about Russia's 'inevitable victory' in Ukraine. The government has also ramped up censorship, fining and imprisoning critics of the war under the broad 'fake news' laws. At the same time, it has launched a 'prestige campaign' highlighting new military achievements and infrastructure projects in annexed territories.

Some analysts argue that Putin's core supporters are immune to bad news. 'They live in a parallel information universe where Russia is winning, the West is collapsing, and Putin is a hero,' says Maria Lipman, a political analyst. 'The problem is that this narrative has become harder to sell as shortages and casualties become undeniable.'

Economic measures may offer a short-term fix. The government has announced pension increases and subsidies for families with children, aiming to shore up support among older and rural voters. But these measures are expensive and inflationary, and they cannot mask the fundamental problems: a war economy that is cannibalizing civilian production, a shrinking labor force, and international isolation.

International Ramifications

A decline in Putin's popularity at home has direct consequences for Russia's foreign policy. A leader under domestic pressure may be more inclined to take aggressive action abroad to distract from problems at home. This 'rally around the flag' effect is well-documented: during the 2014 annexation of Crimea, Putin's approval rating soared to over 80%. But such effects are typically short-lived, and the current war has already exceeded its shelf life.

Conversely, a weak Putin might be more open to negotiations. Some Western diplomats hope that the drop in ratings will make the Kremlin more willing to consider a ceasefire. But there is little evidence so far: Russia has instead intensified its bombing of Ukrainian cities and expanded its military campaign in the Kharkiv region. The internal power struggle could push the leadership toward even more reckless decisions, as hawks demand a final push to break Ukraine's will.

The Information War: Controlling the Narrative

The halt of VTsIOM data is just the latest example of the Kremlin's battle to control information. Independent polls are increasingly difficult to conduct, as the government labels many organizations 'foreign agents' and restricts access to the public. Yet even state-controlled polls face pressure. In 2023, VTsIOM was forced to adjust its methodology after publishing numbers that showed a sharp decline in trust; the new methodology produced higher numbers, but also drew accusations of manipulation.

Social media and messaging apps remain relatively free, providing an outlet for discontent. The Telegram channels run by war bloggers, some of whom are highly critical of the military command, have millions of subscribers. Polls conducted on these platforms—admittedly unscientific—show approval ratings well below 50%. The Kremlin's go-to tactic—claims of Western interference and 'fakes'—is losing its effectiveness as more Russians encounter the reality of the war firsthand through relatives serving on the front lines.

What Comes Next?

The immediate future hinges on whether Putin's ratings stabilize or continue to fall. If the decline persists, the Kremlin may resort to more drastic measures: a new wave of repression, a surprise military victory (if one can be achieved), or a shift in economic policy. The possibility of a palace coup, while remote, cannot be entirely dismissed. The Russian elite is acutely aware that their fortunes are tied to Putin's survival, but some may calculate that a change at the top is preferable to a downward spiral.

Meanwhile, the daily lives of ordinary Russians continue to deteriorate. In small towns, where poverty and alcoholism are rampant, the war is an abstract concept. In cities, the lack of imported goods and the flight of multinational companies have left visible gaps. Young Russians vote with their feet: emigration rates remain high, especially among educated professionals. The demographic drain is a ticking time bomb for a country already facing a population crisis.

The VTsIOM data blackout is a symptom of a deeper malaise. By refusing to acknowledge the shift in public sentiment, the Kremlin is not protecting itself—it is blinding itself. In a system where decisions are made based on wishes rather than facts, the risk of miscalculation grows. Whether Russia slides into internal turmoil or lurches into further external adventures, the world is watching a regime that, for the first time in years, appears to be losing control of the narrative—and perhaps of the country itself.

Source: Tagesspiegel News